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中國目前面臨的挑戰(zhàn)是如何振興二十國集團（G20），將其打造為一個規(guī)模雖小卻更專注于維護世界秩序的機構(gòu)。尤其是在當(dāng)下，聯(lián)合國雖然包容性強，但機構(gòu)沉悶，缺乏活力，而七國集團（G7）又在不斷被邊緣化。
為了達成這一目標，中國必須：
頂住美國及其盟友對中國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展理念和沖突解決方式的攻擊，發(fā)揮有效的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用；反對美國及其盟友的炮艦外交，和美國建立切實的合作關(guān)系，維護中國的領(lǐng)土主權(quán)和經(jīng)濟利益；制定對策，闡述“一帶一路”倡議和本國領(lǐng)土主張；擴大區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟伙伴關(guān)系（RCEP）影響，以替代瀕臨破產(chǎn)的跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系（TPP）。
不論是從政治還是經(jīng)濟的角度來看，G20集團內(nèi)部分歧都源自三個不同群體（發(fā)達國家、新興市場、發(fā)展中國家）對于話語權(quán)、需求和權(quán)力的不同訴求。
發(fā)達國家的經(jīng)濟下滑已經(jīng)持續(xù)多年。中下階層的通脹調(diào)整收入跟半個世紀以前持平，而僅占1%的富豪階層的收入?yún)s在成倍增長?？謶趾筒粷M情緒蔓延，貿(mào)易保護主義、孤立主義、宗派主義，甚至仇外心理高漲。同時，金融市場和金融機構(gòu)不斷爆發(fā)丑聞，追求快錢投機，失去立足的根本。
以金磚國家為代表的新興市場，雖然不斷遭受挫折，但也已不再滿足于屈居美國之后。他們努力增強政治和經(jīng)濟優(yōu)勢，希望在國際談判桌上爭得發(fā)言權(quán)。這些國家的GDP占全球經(jīng)濟總量的23%，人口占全球53%，他們的利益訴求和發(fā)達國家不同。
發(fā)展中國家多數(shù)面臨執(zhí)政危機，對基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資和人道主義救援有極大的需求。這使他們逐漸把目光從美國的自由民主資本主義轉(zhuǎn)向中國宏觀調(diào)控下的市場經(jīng)濟體制。即使中國近幾年“增速下降”，但6.6%的增長速度仍使中國成為一個強有力的經(jīng)濟榜樣。
在國內(nèi)及世界媒體眼中，美國與中國之間的較量早已開始。如今，美國早已不是唯一的霸主，一場利益和挑戰(zhàn)的多邊角逐正在上演。
在經(jīng)濟上，發(fā)達國家在不斷變化的競爭態(tài)勢中步履蹣跚，中國等新興市場的競爭力卻越來越強。發(fā)達國家的社保制度無以為繼，民主政治軟弱無力，一切推動經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)性改革的努力也都以失敗告終。
在依賴資源出口的發(fā)展中國家和新興市場中，中國的高速發(fā)展引發(fā)資源供應(yīng)鏈的擴張，造成資源所有權(quán)的整合，因此這些國家有望在下一經(jīng)濟周期中獲利。
在中國、東南亞和印度等經(jīng)濟高速發(fā)展地區(qū)，熱錢流入和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資帶來的就業(yè)和經(jīng)濟增長已經(jīng)引發(fā)關(guān)注。由于基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的匱乏，發(fā)展中國家無法把產(chǎn)品推向市場，缺少公路、鐵路、港口、機場、飲用水、排水系統(tǒng)和可靠能源使得這些國家發(fā)展緩慢。未來五年中，亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的需求超過8萬億美元。忽略非洲和南美不計，全球的需求是13萬億美元。根據(jù)經(jīng)濟乘數(shù)效應(yīng)的理論，每花費1萬億美元將產(chǎn)生3萬億美元的效益。以此推算，在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施領(lǐng)域每投資1萬億美元，全球年度GDP將增長5%。
2008年，我質(zhì)疑過G20集團的作用，因為在美國市場崩潰時，G20集團只發(fā)了一份不溫不火的聯(lián)合聲明。
現(xiàn)在回頭看，其實在當(dāng)時的情況下，靠20國財長解決問題是不太可能的，因為這場金融危機不僅暴露了一系列巨大的龐氏騙局，把整個發(fā)達世界的金融產(chǎn)業(yè)都拖下了水，后來還余波不斷，牽扯出更多的惡意操作行為。
如今，又過去了8年，世界經(jīng)濟、政治、社會結(jié)構(gòu)卻比冷戰(zhàn)時期更加松散。二戰(zhàn)后形成的國際機構(gòu)，如國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行、亞洲開發(fā)銀行、聯(lián)合國、世界貿(mào)易組織等日漸衰退；而美國在政治、軍事、經(jīng)濟、文化等領(lǐng)域的單極主導(dǎo)地位也逐步讓位于以中國快速發(fā)展為核心、以亞洲為主導(dǎo)的多極格局。
如今，世界正處在不斷變化的格局當(dāng)中。雖然美國資源豐富，并長期一家獨大，但如今只能勉強維持，它將以中國為中心的新興經(jīng)濟體的崛起視為威脅。每天，我們都能看到現(xiàn)實版肥皂劇在各大國際媒體上演。截至目前，美國一直在模仿一戰(zhàn)前英國對德國的做法，試圖借助同盟遏制中國。然而，眾所周知，這不會有什么好結(jié)果。
新興的多極世界格局正日漸成形。在杭州峰會這樣的中國時刻即將到來之際，中國政府應(yīng)當(dāng)采取主動，推動基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施發(fā)展在全球范圍內(nèi)達成共識，為自己的商品和服務(wù)挖掘更廣闊的市場。中國應(yīng)當(dāng)闡述其處理領(lǐng)土和貿(mào)易爭端的理念，并且向世界表明，它所提出的貿(mào)易和發(fā)展建議、互不干涉的原則和達成共識的模式，不只適用于過去，也將有助于未來。
（作者：埃納爾·唐恩（Einar Tangen），美國I-MCF董事會主席、央視時事評論員）
Hangzhou G20, a China Moment By Einar Tangen
Lead: With the established global world order looking increasingly shaky, China could seize momentum and help generate stability with the upcoming G20 Summit in Hangzhou.
The G20 Hangzhou Summit will take place in the midst of rising global political, military, economic and cultural tensions. Tensions are as much a product of changing political, economic paradigms, as they are about clashing national interests.
Beijing's challenge will be to revive and reinvigorate the G20 into an organization that can be a smaller and more focused forum for world order, than the inclusive but ponderous United Nations, or the increasingly irrelevant G7.
To accomplish this Beijing must:
Demonstrate it can play an effective leadership role, in the face of any efforts by Washington or its allies to undermine its new means and methods for economic development and conflict resolution.
Figure out a working relationship with Washington, which does not involve gunboat diplomacy and proxy attacks by the US or its allies, on China's sovereign and economic interests.
Decide how it will handle the contradictions between its “Belt and Road” initiative and its territorial posture.
Reinvigorate and implement the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), as an alternative to the faltering Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Politically and economically, the tensions within the G20 involve three distinct groups-- developed, emerging and developing nations, and are about voices, needs and power.
Developed nations have been sliding sideways economically for years. Middle and lower class inflation adjusted incomes are at the same levels they were almost a half century ago, while the wealth of the top 1% has grown exponentially. While fear and discontent pushes protectionism, isolationism, sectarianism and Xenophobia, the financial markets and the institutions are mired in scandals and increasingly ignore their real market purposes, in favor of quick money speculation.
Emerging nations, like the BRICS, despite setbacks, are no longer content to play second fiddle to a mono-polar US. They are looking to advance their political and economic interests and want a say at the global bargaining table. With over 23% of the world's GDP and over 53% of its population, they have different interests from the developed nations they sell their resources and goods. For China in particular, there is an interest in emerging and developing countries as markets for their goods and services.
Developing nations, beset with governance issues, starved for infrastructure investment and humanitarian aid, are less prone to see the Washington Consensus, or the American Exceptionalism based on liberal democratic capitalism, as a model they can emulate and are turning their gazes increasingly to China's centrally-guided and individually-motivated system. Even in light of China's "slow down," China's dramatic rise and 6.6% growth rate, is a powerful model.
The visible edge of this political battle is being played out, in the domestic and global media, as a contest between the US and China. The reality is that the world is no longer a mono-polar monopoly of the US, but an emerging multi-polar reality with competing interests and challenges.
Economically, developed countries are faltering due to changing competitive dynamics; there is more competition from emerging nations like China, for markets. Unsustainable social benefit programs and the political inability of democracies to push through needed economic structural reforms have failed to address these issues.
In developing and emerging nations depending on resource export, China's massive growth distended the supply chains for resources, resulting in a consolidation of resource ownership, a fact which is poising them for profit during the next economic cycle.
In high growth areas like China, Southeast Asia and India, there are concerns about hot money flows and the need for infrastructure investments to drive job creation and growth. The want of infrastructure is the reason that developing nations, which could feed themselves and export the rest, see their products rot before they can get to market. Lack of roads, rail, ports, airports, potable water, sewers and reliable energy are holding these countries back. The need for infrastructure in Asia alone is over US$ 8 trillion and worldwide US$ 13 trillion over the next five years, a figure which glosses over the needs of Africa and South America. The economic multiplier for an additional US$ 1 trillion in infrastructure, estimated to be US$ 3 trillion for every US$ 1 trillion spent, would increase yearly world GDP by more than 5%.
In 2008, I questioned the usefulness of the G20, which despite sober hopes, managed only a lukewarm joint statement of principles, in reaction to the U.S. market meltdown.
It seemed improbable that a group of 20 finance ministers, no matter how well intentioned, or how urgent the need, could address a financial crisis which had exposed a massive Ponzi scheme. The scheme was an indictment of the entire developed world's financial industries. Unfortunately, that has not stopped, as continuing revelations about manipulations by major players indicate.
Eight years later, the world is more economically, politically and socially fragmented than it has been since the height of the Cold War. The structures put in place after WWII, the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations and the World Trade Organization are showing their age. In the meantime, America's political, military, economic and cultural mono-polar dominance is slowly giving way to a multi-polar reality, highlighted by a rising Asia centering around China's development.
Today, the world faces a changing paradigm, previously mono-polar U.S. is trying to retain its spheres of influence. It perceives the rising tide of emerging economies, at the center of which is China, as a threat to its previous areas of influence. Each day we see the real life soap opera played out in the international media; so far the US has been copying Great Britain's strategy with Germany, prior to WWI, by trying to contain China using proxies and alliances. As we know, it did not end well.
The emerging multi-polar world is still taking shape. For this to be a China Moment, Beijing will have to take the initiative in Hangzhou and start outlining a consensus process for how to drive infrastructure development worldwide, as a means of creating markets that can afford its goods and services. It will have to internally resolve its ideas of territory and trade, and Beijing will have to indicate how its trade and development proposals, non-intervention and consensus models are the future not just the past.
EinarTangen is now an economic and political affairs author and commentator.